IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSANT
Legal principles are assumed to make up an important part of jurisprudence. To understand the concept, it can be stated that legal principles are the norms, or the limitations assumed to be just standards of behavior of society or entire humanity. This idea is cherished worldwide as these principles are considered as one of the sources of law, either formally listed as such, or substantively present in promulgated law. Evidence of its importance lies in the fact that almost all actions are regulated by law in one way or the other. Hence one is not allowed to take refuge under umbrella of defense that one was not aware of the rules/laws to abide by. In this regard one very commonly followed principle is ignorantia juris non excusant which literally means “ignorance of law is no excuse”. Since law also contains some “grey-area” which means that it is subject to interpretation in case-specific circumstances there must be some exception which justifies departure from the said principle. Now technically speaking law over the time has evolved or better say keeps on evolving and that it becomes nearly impossible for any person to know-it-all so one can use this fact in one’s own defense. But before explaining any such exceptional circumstances we must discuss the notion, scope and application behind “ignorance of law is no excuse”.
Ignorantia juris non excusat or ignorantia legis neminem excusat are Latin equivalents for “ignorance of the law excuses not” and “ignorance of law excuses no one” respectively. It actually means that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability for violating that law merely by being unaware of its content. To put it simple it asserts that if someone breaks the law, one is still liable even if one had no knowledge of law being broken. This doctrine first showed up in the Bible as “if a person sins and does what is forbidden in any of the Lord’s commands, even though he does not know it, he is guilty and will be held responsible”. Whereas many European-law countries with a tradition of Roman law use an equivalent expression from Aristotle translated into Latin: nemo censetur ignorare legem meaning “nobody is thought to be ignorant of the law” or ignorantia iuris nocet meaning “not knowing the law is harmful”. Even many jurists and legal experts around the globe define it in differently by stating that “every person is presumed to know the law or ought to have known the law” is a statement which emerges from the statement “ignorance of law is no excuse”.
But in the application of the maxim the word ignorantia has been translated as “ignorance” or “mistake” and both terms have interchangeably been used. It should be noted that these two English words convey different ideas. To better grasp the concept, it is worth mentioning that Lord Westbury in Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2H. L. 170 observes that the word Jus in the maxim is used in the sense of “general law; the law of country”, not in the sense of a “private right”. He further mentions that the true meaning of maxim is that parties cannot excuse themselves from liability from all civil or criminal consequences of their acts by alleging ignorance of law, but there is no presumption to know all the legal consequences of their acts. Salmond also agrees to the fact that there is no sufficient justification for applying the maxim in full extent without uncompromising rigidity. Therefore, viewed thus, there is a good justification of the dilution of this principle. Even so to quote Lord Ellenborough’s word “there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried, it would be urged in almost every case” supports the departure from the rule that ignorance of law is no excuse.
On the other hand, over a hundred and thirty years ago, Maula J. pointed out in Martindalev v. Falkner (1846): “There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the Law. it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so.” Even the great common law judge of 20th century Lord Atkin observed in Evans v. Bartam that there was no presumption that everyone knows the law. Justice Lush in R v Tewkesbury corporation (LR 3 QB 629) observed that “there is no maxim which says that for all intents and purposes a person must be taken to know the legal consequences of his acts”. Therefore, the jurists/scholars on re-examination of complication arising out of the maxim “ignorance of law is no excuse” have suggested relaxations in particular circumstances. Likewise, the courts in the United States of America also considers granting leverage to the innocent accused by providing “due process clause”. In this regard the Supreme Court of the USA held in Lambert v. California that if the person neither knows nor would have known then the due process clause of the Constitution encumbers the conviction of such person conspicuously. Whereas the very famous Norwegian jurist J. Andenaes has referred to the situations whereby the accused can be acquitted merely due to mistake committed in ignorance of law. At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to take note of the observations of Lord Westbury in Spread V Morgan 11 HL case 588(602) which is reproduced as “it is true that the law will not permit the excuse of ignorance of law to be pleaded for the purpose of exempting persons from damages for breach of contract or for crimes committed by them but on other occasions and for other purposes it is evident that the fact that such ignorance existed will sometimes be recognised so as to affect a judicial decision”
That is how the maxim Ignorantia praesumitur ubi scientia non probatur which literally means “ignorance is presumed when knowledge is not proved” took over the maxim ignorantia juris non excusant and became more popular with evolution in the arena of human rights. The scope and position of this maxim is no different in Pakistan from rest of the world. In this regard the meaning and applicability can better be understood by taking a look into the precedent titled Shafiull Mulk v. Chairman Agriculture (1999 CLC 1892) wherein the Honorable High Court after applying the principle of “ignorance is presumed where the knowledge is not proved” benefitted the petitioner with a co-relative principle of “ignorance of one does not prejudice the right” and directed authorities to take necessary steps accordingly. Therefore, keeping all discussion above in view, it can surely be stated that the maxim “ignorance is presumed when knowledge is not proved” can be applied in fit cases and that subject to facts and circumstances of the case, its application is warranted.
